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A	window	into	the	soul:	Biosensing	in	public	Elaine	Sedenberg,	Richmond	Wong,	John	Chuang		
Abstract:	Biosensed	information	represents	an	emerging	class	of	data	with	the	potential	for	massive,	systematic,	and	remote	or	casual	collection	of	personal	information	about	people.	Biosensors	capture	physiological	signals	in	addition	to	kinesthetic	data	to	draw	intimate	inferences	about	individuals’	mental	states.	The	proliferation	of	sensors	makes	detection,	 interpretation,	 and	 inference	 of	 these	 previously	 subtle	 –	 or	 otherwise	invisible	 –	 emotional	 and	 physiological	 signals	 possible	 from	 proximate	 and	 remote	locations.	These	sensors	pose	unprecedented	challenges	to	individual	privacy	in	public	through	remote,	precise,	and	passively	collected	data.	This	paper	examines	the	unique	nature	and	inferential	potential	of	biosensed	data	by	creating	a	taxonomy	of	signals	that	may	be	collected	remotely,	via	casual	contact,	or	from	traces	left	behind,	and	considers	how	 these	 data	 may	 be	 collected	 and	 used	 to	 create	 novel	 privacy	 concerns	 –	particularly	 in	 public.	 Since	 biosignals	 may	 often	 be	 deduced	 from	 visual	 data,	 this	paper	uses	historic	and	recent	photography	cases	to	explore	how	social	norms	evolved	in	 response	 to	 remote	 collection	 in	 public.	 A	 contextual	 integrity	 privacy	 heuristic	 is	then	 used	 to	 probe	 the	 need	 for	 new	 norms	 and	 remedies	 specifically	 for	 biosensing	privacy	threats.	This	analysis	examines	the	extensibility	of	relevant	legal	frameworks	in	the	European	Union	(EU)	and	United	States	(US)	as	a	privacy	remedy,	and	conclude	with	a	 brief	 outline	of	 possible	 legal	 or	 social	 remedies	 that	may	 address	privacy	needs	 in	public	with	biosensing	technologies.	
Introduction	There	 is	 a	 growing	 public	 consciousness	 of	 the	 information	 trails	 and	 digital	 traces	generated	throughout	our	everyday	lives	–	keystrokes,	smartphones,	electronic	records,	and	 interactions	 with	 digital	 interfaces	 leave	 millions	 of	 breadcrumbs	 outlining	 our	physical	paths	and	generate	opportunities	 for	 social	 inferences	 (see,	 e.g.,	Madden	and	Rainie	2015).	But	what	about	our	physiological	and	emotional	states?	Our	heart	rates,	body	 temperatures,	 expressions,	 tones,	 involuntary	 reflexes,	 and	biological	 signatures	make	us	human	yet	expose	our	innermost	nuanced	physical	and	mental	states.	Though	these	 signals	 have	 existed	 throughout	 human	 time,	 this	 potential	 for	 sensors	 to	continuously	record	en	masse	and	to	systematically	analyze	our	innate	biological	nature	uncovers	a	new	sensitive	data	class:	biosensed	information.		Many	 scholars	 have	 begun	 grappling	 with	 privacy	 and	 the	 ethical	 implications	stemming	from	the	quantified-self	movement	and	the	wearable	industry’s	collection	of	these	 data	 (see,	 e.g.,	 Crawford,	 Lingel,	 Karppi	 2015).	 Though	 biosensing	 is	 commonly	associated	with	wearables	or	sensors	embedded	into	“smart”	objects,	little	attention	has	been	paid	 to	 the	potential	of	 these	biosignals	 to	be	captured	publicly	 from	a	group	of	non-consenting	individuals	over	extended	timescales	–	either	remotely,	through	casual	contact,	or	 from	biological	 traces	 left	behind.	Consumers	of	wearables	have	agency	 to	put	 on	 or	 take	 off	 a	 wearable	 they	 own,	 while	 biosensing	 in	 public	 –	 outside	 of	 the	consumer	framework,	 thus	bypassing	consent,	at	 least	 in	part	–	 frustrates	our	current	privacy	norms.	Even	though	many	of	the	same	issues	–	integrity,	accidental	disclosure,	inferential	potential,	generation	of	new	knowledge,	etc.	–	are	shared	across	both	device	
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owners	 and	 general	 data	 subjects,	 the	 lack	 of	 consent,	 leaky	 information	 flows,	 and	potential	for	large-scale	collection	and	analysis	by	a	wide	spectrum	of	actors	makes	this	a	particularly	thorny	issue.		This	paper	examines	the	unique	nature	and	inferential	potential	of	biosensed	data	more	broadly,	 to	 understand	 the	urgency	 to	 consider	 how	 these	data	may	be	 collected	 and	used	 to	 create	 new	 privacy	 concerns,	 particularly	 in	 public.	 It	 then	maps	 a	 subset	 of	current	 biosensing	 technologies	 that	may	 collect	 data	 remotely,	 via	 casual	 contact,	 or	from	 traces	 left	 behind,	 to	 outline	 the	 current	 capabilities	 of	 biosensing	 technologies	and	root	potential	privacy	harms	within	current	technical	capabilities.	Since	static	and	video	images	may	be	used	to	deduce	many	biosignals	remotely,	this	paper	analyzes	the	past	 evolution	 of	 social	 norms	 to	 mitigate	 or	 accept	 new	 privacy	 threats	 posed	 by	developments	 in	 camera	 technology.	 Understanding	 the	 role	 of	 past	 social	 norms	 in	mitigating	harms	posed	by	portable,	 consumer-grade	 camera	devices	helps	 illuminate	the	 potential	 role	 norms	may	play	within	 a	 biosensing	 context.	 Specifically	 given	 this	shift	 in	 information	potential	without	a	shift	 in	underlying	technology,	this	paper	uses	Nissenbaum’s	 (2010)	 “contextual	 integrity”	privacy	heuristic	 to	 fully	explore	 the	need	for	 new	 norms	 and	 remedies	 for	 biosensing	 in	 a	 commercial	 public	 context.	 This	analysis	 exposes	 the	 need	 to	 reassess	 the	 conceptual	 privacy	 risk	 models	 beyond	informational	 privacy.	 Based	 on	 this	 examination	 of	 social	 norms,	 remedies,	 and	exploration	 of	 biosensing’s	 privacy	 risk	 models,	 this	 paper	 examines	 relevant	 legal	frameworks	 in	 the	 European	 Union	 (EU)	 and	 United	 States	 (US)	 to	 establish	 the	extensibility	 and	 potential	 gaps	 when	 applied	 to	 remote	 biosensing	 privacy	 harms.	Finally,	this	paper	concludes	with	a	brief	outline	of	possible	legal	or	social	remedies	that	may	address	privacy	needs	in	public	with	biosensing	technologies.		Certainly,	 many	 of	 the	 technologies	 and	 capabilities	 are	 just	 now	 on	 the	 cusp	 of	development	(past	laboratory	prototypes	or	proof-of-concept	analytics):	this	paper	calls	attention	 to	 and	 anticipates	 privacy	 concerns	 relating	 to	 these	 emerging	 technologies	and	systems,	examining	what	is	not	quite	yet	reality,	but	is	far	beyond	mere	speculation.	
The	nature	of	biosensed	data	Biosignals	 represent	 an	 emerging	 class	 of	 data	 with	 the	 potential	 for	 massive,	systematic,	and	remote	or	casual	collection	of	intimate	information.	The	proliferation	of	sensors	makes	detection,	 interpretation,	 and	 inference	of	 these	previously	 subtle	–	or	otherwise	invisible	–	emotional	and	physiological	signals	possible	from	proximate	and	remote	 locations.	 Although	 these	 cues	 are	 essential	 to	 biological	 survival	 and	 have	existed	 for	millennia,	 technology	 stands	 to	 sense	 and	 collect	 these	 data	 on	 orders	 of	magnitude	more	perceptive	than	the	human	eye,	and	on	extended	timescales	impossible	through	casual	observation.		Biosensing	 technologies	are	being	developed	 to	 capture	a	wide	 range	of	physiological	signals	 from	 which	 inferences	 may	 be	 drawn,	 including	 our	 mental	 and	 emotional	states,	predispositions	to	diseases,	or	proclivities	to	particular	behaviors.	Many	of	these	states	are	unknown	or	subconscious	to	us,	and	many	of	these	patterns	are	not	yet	fully	understood	by	modern	 science.	 The	 applications	 and	business	models	 emerging	 from	biosensed	 information	will	 raise	new	security	 and	privacy	 challenges	 that	 are	not	yet	fully	comprehended	or	anticipated.	
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This	 new	 emerging	 class	 of	 data	 sets	 itself	 apart	 from	 existing	 information	 types	through	a	set	of	unique	characteristics.	•	 Expansive	in	scope.	Measurable	signals	are	diverse	and	include	physiological	(e.g.,	electroencephalogram	(EEG),	electrocardiogram	(ECG),	heart	rate	(HR),	electromyography	(EMG),	electrodermal	activity	(EDA,	otherwise	known	as	Galvanic	Skin	Response	or	GSR),	functional	near-infrared	spectroscopy	(fNIRS),	blood	pressure,	blood	glucose)	and	kinesthetic	(e.g.,	accelerometry,	eye-tracking,	facial	expression	recognition).	From	combinations	of	these	signals,	inferences	about	the	body	or	actions	can	be	drawn	to	deduce	emotional	states,	physical	reactions,	and	even	memories	and	thoughts.	•	 Intimate	yet	leakable.	Biosensors	may	be	wearables	(e.g.,	commercial	fitness	trackers	worn	on	the	wrist,	which	require	opt-in	and	are	removable)	as	well	as	remote	(e.g.,	heart	rate	monitoring	through	surveillance	video	feeds,	which	do	not	require	contact	or	consent	and	which	may	be	invisible	to	the	data	subject),	and	they	may	be	standalone	or	embedded	in	everyday	objects.	Given	biosignals	may	be	naturally	–	and	largely	uncontrollably	–	emitted	as	signatures	(e.g.,	electrical,	chemical,	or	biological)	or	as	involuntary	impulses,	the	information	flows	are	leaky	in	the	sense	that	diverse	actors	(or	multiple	actors	at	once)	may	sense	them	remotely	or	through	brief	contact.	•	 Precise	yet	ambiguous.	Biosensors	are	increasingly	able	to	produce	readings	with	many	significant	figures,	yet	the	high-level	inferences	drawn	from	these	raw	signals	will	be	context	dependent	and	highly	ambiguous.	For	instance,	a	single	emotion	may	have	different	associations	or	spectrums	for	one	individual	compared	to	others.	•	 Familiar	yet	unverifiable.	When	shown	a	photo,	audio	clip,	or	geolocation	tag	of	themselves,	it	is	usually	fairly	straightforward	to	confirm	these	data	match	the	ground	truth	of	a	data	subject’s	experience.	However,	if	shown	a	biosignal,	such	as	an	EEG	recording,	it	would	be	much	more	difficult	to	confirm	its	provenance	relating	to	themselves,	not	to	mention	verify	its	accuracy.	Further,	experiences	may	not	always	map	to	the	measurements:	one	may	feel	a	racing	heart	at	the	sight	of	a	romantic	crush,	but	it	may	or	may	not	correspond	to	an	increase	in	heart	rate.	•	 Limited	controlability.	Many	of	these	signals,	like	those	associated	with	respiration,	or	involuntary	reflexes	are	controlled	by	the	autonomic	nervous	system	and	are	difficult	to	consciously	control.	Our	biological	signals,	like	fingerprints	or	genetic	profiles,	are	similarly	difficult	to	control	since	individuals	leave	traces	through	casual	contact.	Some	of	these	signals,	impulses,	and	signatures	may	be	obscured	through	conscious	overriding	(e.g.,	deep	breathing)	or	obfuscated	by	physical	barriers.		Unlike	 many	 other	 information	 flows	 that	 require	 computer-mediated	 interaction,	biosensed	 data	 are	 emitted	 as	 (or	 may	 be	 inferred	 from	 changes	 in)	 thermal	 and	electromagnetic	radiation,	visual	or	observable	cues,	biochemical	signals	and	traces,	or	encoded	in	biological	signatures.	While	sensors	may	be	voluntarily	worn	by	consumers	or	 self-recorded	 and	 collated	 by	 quantified	 self-enthusiasts,	 developing	 and	 emerging	technologies	 enable	 even	more	data	 streams	 to	 be	 collected	 remotely,	 through	 casual	contact	 –	 meaning	 sensors	 that	 may	 be	 briefly,	 and	 perhaps	 unknowingly,	 touched	through	 everyday	 interaction	 –	 or	 through	 physical	 traces	 left	 behind.	 This	 potential	makes	 biosensed	 data	 collection	 with	 no	 opportunity	 for	 consent	 a	 new	 privacy	challenge	for	individuals	in	public	spaces.		
  4 
For	 each	 potential	 type	 of	 biosensed	 information,	 sensors	 or	 diagnostics	 can	 be	operated	from	a	distance	to	the	individual	data	subject,	after	the	subject	has	left	a	trace,	or	through	casual	contact	that	might	be	mediated	by	everyday	interactions	like	touching	a	 door	 handle,	 or	 sitting	 on	 a	 bench.	 This	 paper	 specifically	 aims	 to	 focus	 on	 the	potential	of	biosensing	technology	apart	from	wearable	devices	in	order	to	fully	grapple	with	 information	 flows	 that	 may	 involve	 no	 prior	 consent	 or	 knowledge	 from	 the	individual	data	subject.	Remote	biosensing	may	be	deployed	on	 top	of	existing	sensor	technology	–	 such	as	 cameras	–	by	 introducing	new	analytical	processes	 that	uncover	previously	 undetected	 biosignals,	 or	 through	 the	 deployment	 of	 entirely	 new	 sensor	technology.	 		
Table	1	presents	a	taxonomy	of	sensors	and	potential	capabilities	by	type	of	signal,	
measurable	biosensed	phenomena,	inferential	potential,	and	relevance	to	remote,	
traceable,	or	casual	contact	public	collection.	Table	1:	A	taxonomy	of	sensors	and	potential	capabilities	
Measurable	
phenomena	or	
characteristic	
Methods	of	
measurement	
Example	potential	
inferences	
Distance	and	interaction	
potential	
Body	temperature	 Infrared	thermal	radiation	 Activity	level;	health	status;	acute	changes	in	stress	levels	 Remote	via	infrared	cameras	or	infrared	thermometers	(spot	ratio	for	accurate	measurement	is	several	feet	away)	(Scigiene	Corporation,	n.d.).	Heart	rate	 Electromagnetic	radiation;	radio	frequency	(electromagnetic	fields)	
Activity	level;	health	status;	changes	in	excitement	or	stress	 Vital	Radio	(several	feet	away,	possible	through	walls)	(Adib	et	al.	2015;	Mullan	et	al.	2015;	Wang	et	al.	2015).	Remote	and	smartphone	cameras	also	may	be	able	to	detect	pulse	and	heart	abnormalities	(Hewitt	2013;	Li	et	al.	2014)	(several	feet	away;	eyeshot)	Eye	tracking	 Infrared	and	near-infrared	non-collimated	light	reflections	
Attention;	gaze;	drowsiness;	traumatic	brain	injuries	 Some	eye	tracking	technology	requires	a	stable	head,	but	new	devices	do	not,	or	take	advantage	of	other	devices	on	the	head	(e.g.,	glasses,	headset).	Measurement	could	be	taken	from	a	high-resolution	camera	a	few	feet	in	front	of	the	subject.	Retinal	scan	 Infrared	light	absorption		 Identity;	presence	of	health	conditions	(e.g.,	diabetes,	stroke,	hypertension,	heart	disease,	neurovascular	disease,	etc.)	(MacGillivray	et	al.	2014).	
Close	proximity	and	bright	light.	
Iris	scan/pupil	 Camera	with	 Identity;	arousal;	health	 High-resolution	images	of	the	eye	
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dilation	 infrared	illumination	or	electromagnetic	radiation	
status	(e.g.,	stroke	history,	or	in	children	leukocoia,	an	early	sign	of	retinoblastoma)	(Clusmann,	Schaller,	Schramm	2001;	Palca	2014).	
–	potentially	through	proximate	but	still	remote	means	via	other	technologies	like	Virtual	Reality	(VR)	headsets.	
Facial	recognition	 Electromagnetic	radiation	 Identity;	presence	of	genetic	disorders	(Cooper	2014).	 Low-resolution	images	of	a	face.	Emotion	 Electromagnetic	radiation	 Mental	or	emotional	states.	 Video	or	images	of	face	may	be	made	from	a	distance	to	capture	microexpressions.	Fingerprints	 Image	patterns	for	identifying	characteristics	 Identity	 Traces	may	be	left	behind	during	casual	contact,	but	fingerprints	may	be	sensed	through	contactless	scanning	in	one	second	(Biotime	Technology	2014).		Each	 measureable	 phenomena	 on	 its	 own	 –	 such	 as	 heart	 rate,	 temperature,	 pupil	dilation,	etc.	–	may	not	contain	much	inferential	power	since	many	of	these	signals	will	rise	and	fall	in	concert	to	obvious	external	stimuli.	For	example,	several	measures	may	increase	 simultaneously	 if	 an	 individual	 becomes	 startled.	 Insights	 may	 be	 inferred	more	easily,	however,	when	systems	change	asynchronously.	If	heart	rate	speeds	up	but	another	measure	like	blood	oxygenation	or	EDA	stays	constant,	these	data	may	reflect	a	mental	over	an	autonomic	 change	of	 state.	Additionally,	 any	 change	 in	an	 individual’s	usual	 baseline	may	 indicate	 a	 notable	 change.	 Biometric	 authentication	 that	 conducts	facial	recognition	or	fingerprints	–	which	is	already	done	on	some	banking	apps	–	would	also	 inherently	 come	 with	 the	 potential	 to	 give	 private	 companies	 access	 to	 other	biosensed	information	(Corkery	2016).	Given	the	nature	of	biosensed	data,	voluntarily	giving	access	to	one	feature	like	an	iris	scan	may	enable	countless	other	inferences	to	be	made	simultaneously.		The	 inferential	 potential,	 beyond	 mere	 physiological	 responses	 derived	 from	 these	sensors	 and	 analytics,	 is	 only	 beginning	 to	 come	 to	 light.	 Leaning	 upon	 small-scale	studies	–	the	current	state	of	the	art	in	this	area	of	research	–	one	can	understand	how	these	biosensing	systems	may	be	able	to	uncover	unknown	emotional	or	physiological	states	hidden	in	plain	view.	Our	microexpressions	lie	underneath	outward	facades	or	in	fleeting	looks,	and	betray	concealed	or	subconscious	emotional	states	that	are	too	short	or	subtle	to	notice	with	the	naked	eye	(Adler	2015;	Li	et	al.	2015).	Outside	of	biosensing,	there	 are	 proof-of-concept	 academic	 studies	 that	 demonstrate	 an	 ability	 to	 predict	health	conditions	based	on	language	use	alone.	One	research	group	used	language	from	Twitter	(in	particular,	the	use	of	angry	language)	to	predict	heart	disease	mortality	at	a	community	 level.	 Another	 study	 conducted	 a	 case	 study	 analysis	 of	 former	 US	Presidents	Ronald	Reagan	and	George	H.	Bush	to	retroactively	compare	for	differences	in	discourse	complexity	that	may	be	related	to	early	Alzheimer’s	disease	(Berisha	et	al.	2015).	It	is	notable	that	inferences	like	these	are	able	to	retroactively	examine	existing	corpuses	 to	 deduce	 future	 health	 states.	With	 biosensing	 technology,	 individuals	may	produce	 larger,	more	 intimate	 data	 repositories	 that	 reveal	 not	 only	more	 emotional	granularity	than	a	public	tweet,	but	will	last	into	the	future,	making	retroactive	analyses	
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possible.	 Young	 adults	 may	 build	 biosensed	 dossiers	 in	 their	 twenties	 that	 may	 be	relevant	 in	 30	 years	 for	 unforeseen	 analytics.	 For	 instance,	 researchers	 studied	 the	predictive	associations	of	resting	heart	rate	on	violent	and	non-violent	criminality	using	the	measurements	of	over	700,000	Swedish	men	when	they	began	mandatory	military	conscription	at	age	18.	Researchers	found	a	low	resting	heart	rate	was	associated	with	an	increased	risk	for	violent	criminality,	non-violent	criminality,	risk	of	being	a	victim	of	an	 assault,	 and	 being	 involved	 in	 accidents	 as	 an	 adult	 (Latvala	 et	al.	 2015).	 The	 full	potential	for	insights	and	the	range	of	possible	uses	remain	unknown,	but	the	intimacy	and	raw	potential	are	certain.	
Sensing	and	social	norms	Often,	 the	 introduction	 of	 new	 technologies	 grates	 against	 pre-existing	 social	 norms,	and	societies	are	given	a	relatively	short	timeframe	to	react	and	adjust	laws	accordingly	(Tene	and	Polonetsky	2013).	Bicchieri	(2000)	describes	two	separate	interpretations	of	social	norms:	in	one	norms	are	descriptive	of	what	is	considered	normal	behavior	and,	in	the	other,	norms	are	injunctive	of	what	the	public	believes	should	be	done	for	social	approval	or	disproval.	Laws	may	develop	to	propagate	social	norms	and	further	prevent	social	harm	–	as	was	 the	case	 in	seat	belt	 laws	–	and	 laws	may	also	develop	to	create	torts	or	other	possible	remedies	for	socially	unacceptable	harms	(Licht	2008).		Biosensed	 information,	 particularly	 remote	 biosensing	 to	 collect	 data	 without	 any	physical	 contact,	 frustrates	many	of	 the	 norms	 for	 recording	 in	 public	 places	without	individuals’	 knowledge	 or	 consent.	 This	 is	 especially	 true	 given	 that	 biosensing	 is	entirely	 new	 (at	 least	 outside	 of	 the	 medical	 context)	 and	 is	 experiencing	 rapid	technological	and	analytical	development.	The	following	subsections	explore	two	prior	cases	 of	 remote	 sensing	 in	 public	 –	 specifically,	 the	 capture	 of	 information	 using	photography	 beginning	 with	 the	 amateur	 and	 portable	 Eastman	 Kodak	 Camera,	 and	followed	 by	 the	 Google	 Glass	 embedded	 camera.	 Historically	 images	 could	 capture	expressions	and	situations,	or	tie	individuals	to	particular	locations	–	now	images	(static	or	 video)	 may	 unlock	 new	 inferences	 and	 measurements	 of	 various	 biosignals.	 Each	photography	 case	 provides	 insight	 into	 potential	 social	 norms	 that	 may	 arise	 with	remote	 biosensing	 technologies,	 and	 begins	 to	 explore	 how	 these	 norms	 collide	 and	influence	laws	and	policies.	
Introduction	of	the	Kodak	Camera	The	 introduction	 of	 the	 Eastman	 Kodak	 Camera	 in	 1884	made	 photography	 portable	and	 affordable	 to	 the	 general	 public,	 and	 coincided	 with	 the	 rise	 of	 sensationalistic	journalism	and	 large	print	circulations	 (Solove	and	Schwartz	2015).	Photography	was	brought	into	homes	and	family	life,	and	Kodak	advertising	promoted	the	technology	in	the	 household	 as	 a	 signal	 of	 modernity	 and	 leisure	 (Sarvas	 and	 Frohlich	 2001,	 55).	However,	 this	 new	 technology	 opened	 private	 spaces	 and	 fleeting	 moments	 up	 to	permanent	 scrutiny,	 in	 some	ways	 to	 certify	 our	memories	 or	 impressions	 of	 others	(West	 2000,	 xi).	 In	 response	 to	 public	 fears	 and	 normative	 tensions	 regarding	 the	potential	 invasion	of	 cameras	 and	 relative	permanency	of	 images,	 resort	 beaches	 and	even	 the	 Washington	 Monument	 banned	 their	 use	 temporarily	 until	 law	 and	 social	norms	caught	up	(Lindsay	2000).		Published	in	1890,	the	canonical	article	“The	Right	to	Privacy”	by	Warren	and	Brandeis	explicitly	states:	“Thoughts,	emotions,	and	sensations	demanded	legal	recognition,”	and	
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calls	attention	to	recent	inventions	and	business	methods,	“instantaneous	photographs	and	newspaper	enterprise,”	as	 threats	 to	 the	sacred	precincts	of	private	and	domestic	life	(Warren	and	Brandeis	1890,	195).	This	article	established	the	need	for	a	new	right	for	privacy,	which	was	not	protected	under	common	 law	but	could	be	modified	using	torts	to	redress	harms.		The	 introduction	 of	 the	 camera	 clearly	 illustrates	 a	 time	 where	 social	 norms	 were	forced	to	rapidly	adapt	to	the	presence	of	a	new	ability	to	record	information	(images	that	 relayed	 our	 facial	 expressions,	 locations,	 social	 interactions,	 and	 actions)	 about	ourselves	 and	 others.	 Similarly,	 biosensing	 technology	 presents	 a	 new	 information	 to	record	 physiological	 and	 emotional	 data	 in	 previously	 public,	 invisible,	 or	 fleeting	spaces	 –	 often	 using	 the	 same	 portable	 image	 technology	 or	 similarly	 small,	 and	amateur	 friendly	 recording	 devices.	 Existing	 legal	 frameworks	 were	 not	 prepared	 to	protect	 and	 remedy	 situations	 brought	 on	 by	 the	 collision	 of	 law	 with	 technological	advances,	 and	 adaptations	 had	 to	 be	 made	 in	 order	 to	 keep	 up	 with	 evolving	 social	norms	and	values	around	privacy.	At	present,	 it	seems	absurd	–	 if	not	 impossible	–	 to	ban	 photography	 in	 public	 spaces	 like	 the	Washington	Monument.	 Yet	 there	 are	 still	social	 situations	 where	 it	 would	 be	 seen	 as	 socially	 inappropriate	 to	 take	 photos	 of	others,	even	it	is	technically	legal.	
Google	Glass	Google	Glass,	first	publicly	announced	in	April	2012,	and	released	to	some	members	of	the	public	in	a	public	beta	program	in	April	2013,	provides	insight	into	user	and	media	perspectives	 on	 emerging	 technologies	 and	 the	 privacy	 concerns	 people	may	 raise	 in	anticipation	 of	 the	 release	 of	 new	 devices.	 After	 the	 announcement	 of	 Glass	 in	 2012,	people	imagined	what	it	might	be	like	to	live	in	a	world	with	Glass,	a	world	reflected	in	Glass’s	 portrayal	 in	 Google’s	 promotional	 videos	 and	 advertisements	 and	 in	 broader	media	 discourse.	 Through	 the	process	 of	 speculating	 and	 anticipating	 the	 future	with	Glass,	 people	 began	 raising	 concerns	 about	 remote	 sensing	 and	 privacy	 (Wong	 and	Mulligan	2016).		Google’s	 initial	 conceptual	 video	 of	 Glass	 was	 released	 on	 April	 4,	 2012	 on	YouTube.com.	The	video	is	shot	entirely	in	a	first	person	point	of	view,	only	showing	the	viewpoint	 of	 a	 single	male	 Glass	 user	 as	 he	makes	 his	way	 around	New	York	 City.	 It	never	 shows	 what	 the	 actual	 device	 looks	 like,	 rendering	 the	 device	 invisible.	Furthermore,	the	user	is	never	seen	putting	Glass	on	or	taking	it	off,	suggesting	that	the	device	 is	 worn	 and	 turned	 on	 all	 the	 time,	 and	 not	 taken	 off	 or	 turned	 off	 between	interactions	with	it.	The	video	shows	the	user	walking	in	the	street,	at	a	bookstore,	and	meeting	a	friend	at	a	food	truck.	Notably,	these	are	all	 in	public	or	semi-public	spaces.	Together,	 this	 video	 begins	 to	 portray	 Glass	 as	 a	 device	 that	 seems	 to	 fade	 into	 the	background,	 is	 always	 worn	 and	 always	 turned	 on	 throughout	 the	 day,	 capable	 of	recording	pictures	and	video	at	any	time,	and	used	across	many	contexts	by	one	person.	Against	this	backdrop,	people	began	discussing	concerns	about	privacy	in	several	ways.	First,	 people	 expressed	 concerns	 about	 surveillance	 and	 surreptitious	 recording	 by	(other)	 Glass	 users,	 noting	 that	 people	 could	 be	 secretly	 taking	 pictures	 of	 others	 in	varied	public	places	including	the	subway,	the	street,	airplanes,	or	at	beaches,	clubs,	and	bars	 (Hill	 2012).	 These	 concerns	 were	 facilitated	 by	 the	 perception	 of	 Glass	 as	 an	invisible,	 seamless,	 and	mobile	 technology.	 Second,	 people	 expressed	 concerns	 about	how	 data	 collected	 by	 Google	 through	 Glass	 might	 be	 used.	 Some,	 contemplating	
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Google’s	business	model,	suggested	that	Glass	would	be	used	to	collect	personal	data	to	deliver	more	 advertisements	 (Thier	 2013)	 or	 that	 Glass	would	 share	 data	with	 other	companies	 like	 LinkedIn	 or	 Facebook	 to,	 for	 example,	 conduct	 facial	 recognition	 in	public	(Burns	2013).	A	third	set	of	concerns	was	raised	about	Glass	breaching	structural	social	and	technical	constraints	that	protect	privacy	(Surden	2007).	Perceiving	Glass	as	mobile,	 always-on,	 and	 blending	 into	 the	 background	 suggested	 that	 prior	 structural	constraints	 –	 such	 as	 social	 norms,	 limited	 camera	 battery	 life,	 and	 the	 visibility	 of	smartphones	–	that	prevented	certain	types	of	data	collection	might	change	with	Glass.	Ephemeral	 public	 experiences	 in	 everyday	 life	 might	 unwillingly	 and	 unknowingly	become	 digitally	 archived.	 A	 fourth	 set	 of	 concerns	 about	 Glass	 transgressing	 social	contexts	 was	 raised.	 Glass’s	 mobility	 and	 always-on	 portrayal	 suggested	 that	 it	 was	untethered	to	context,	leading	to	fears	that	information	could	be	taken	from	one	context	and	 easily	 used	 in	 another	 without	 regard	 for	 the	 social	 norms	 that	 usually	 govern	information	flows	in	a	given	context.		As	time	got	closer	to	the	launch	of	the	Google	Glass	beta	program,	some	people	began	taking	 private	 remedies	 to	 protect	 their	 privacy,	 including	 private	 business	 owners	banning	Glass	 in	 bars	 and	 strip	 clubs	 (DiSalvo	 2013),	 and	 the	 formation	 of	 an	 online	campaign	trying	to	ban	Glass	called	Stop	the	Cyborgs.		In	many	ways,	biosensing	technology	is	at	a	similar	stage	of	development	–	still	under	development	but	with	public	exposure.	Like	with	Glass,	the	people	whose	biosignals	are	being	monitored	 and	 collected	may	 not	 be	 able	 to	 see	 the	 sensors	 and	may	 not	 even	know	when	or	where	this	collection	is	occurring.	Biosensing	much	like	Glass	also	raises	questions	 about	 data	 flows	 –	 what	 people,	 companies,	 and	 third	 parties	 are	 able	 to	access	the	data,	and	how	might	that	data	be	used.	Biosensing	also	begins	to	erode	some	structural	 constraints	 that	 protected	privacy	 –	 signals	 that	were	previously	protected	because	 no	 technologies	 or	 techniques	 existed	 to	 record	 them	 can	 now	 be	 recorded.	Moreover,	networked	biosensing	 technologies	have	 the	potential	 to	violate	 contextual	norms.	 Perhaps,	 the	 Glass	 example	 also	 suggests	 that	 when	 new	 technologies	 and	technology	 products	 are	 announced	 and	 publicized,	 productive	 public	 conversations	can	occur	about	the	social	implications	of	those	new	technologies.	
Remote	biosensing	in	context	After	discussing	various	social	norms	and	responses	that	are	associated	with	protecting	privacy	 and	 exploring	 historical	 and	 recent	 cases	 with	 similarities	 to	 biosensing	technologies,	 this	paper	now	turns	to	examine	emerging	aspects	of	remote	biosensing	that	may	be	problematic.	Nissenbaum’s	contextual	integrity	heuristic	provides	a	useful	framework	 to	 compare	 the	 changes	 in	 data	 flows	 afforded	 by	 remote	 biosensing	through	new	analytical	power	on	existing	technology	and	introduction	of	novel	sensors.	Contextual	integrity	holds	that	rather	than	framing	privacy	as	control	and	prevention	of	information	 or	 data	 flows,	 privacy	 is	 better	 understood	 as	 a	 set	 of	 relations	 and	information	 flows	 governed	 by	 “context-relative	 informational	 norms”	 (Nissenbaum	2010).	 That	 is,	 different	 social	 contexts	 have	 varying	 social	 norms	 that	 govern	appropriate	flows	of	information	and	data	–	and	the	violation	of	these	norms	suggests	the	 potential	 violation	 of	 privacy.	 Four	 key	 steps	 emerge	 as	 a	 heuristic	 from	 this	framework:	 1)	 establish	 the	 prevailing	 social	 context;	 2)	 establish	 the	 key	 actors	involved	 in	 the	 information	and	data	 transfer	(including	data	senders,	data	recipients,	
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and	data	subjects);	3)	indicate	what	attributes,	or	data	types,	are	involved;	4)	establish	the	principles	of	data	transmission.	If	new	practices	introduce	changes	to	any	of	these	elements,	it	suggests	a	potential	violation	of	contextual	integrity.	This	provides	a	way	to	understand	and	assess	how	changes	in	practices	may	affect	informational	norms.		The	contextual	integrity	heuristic	is	used	here	to	investigate	a	plausible	deployment	of	remote	biosensing	technologies	at	a	shopping	mall	in	the	US.	While	the	precise	context	described	in	this	scenario	depicts	a	situation	in	a	near,	proximate	future,	it	is	grounded	in	 real,	 developing	 technologies,	 testbeds,	prototypes,	 and	pilot	projects.	By	exploring	these	 possibilities	 while	 technologies	 and	 systems	 are	 still	 in	 development,	 concerns	related	 to	 privacy	 and	discussions	 of	 potential	 remedies	 can	be	 raised	 in	 a	 proactive,	rather	than	reactive	manner,	at	a	time	when	systems	may	still	be	amenable	to	change.	This	 follows	traditions	across	many	fields,	most	notably	 in	recent	calls	 for	“privacy	by	design,”	 which	 advocates	 for	 addressing	 privacy	 concerns	 through	 the	 engineering,	design,	 and	 use	 of	 technologies	 through	 technical,	 business,	 and	 legal	 means	 (	Cavoukian	 2011;	 Computing	 Community	 Consortium	 2015;	 Mulligan	 and	 King	 2011;		Rubinstein	2011).	
Social	context	Imagine	a	number	of	remote	biosensors	 from	Table	5.1	being	used	at	a	shopping	mall	somewhere	 in	 the	 US.	 This	 includes	 infrared	 cameras	 that	 can	 detect	 people’s	 body	temperatures,	 cameras	 and	 wireless	 devices	 that	 can	 sense	 heart	 rate,	 and	 video	cameras	 that	 can	 scan	 faces	 for	 pupil	 dilation,	 facial	 recognition,	 or	 emotion.	 In	 this	example,	a	user-	or	customer-centric	point	of	view	is	 taken,	 focusing	on	practices	that	include	 the	sensing	of	 customers.	Uses	of	 these	remote	biosensing	 technologies	might	include	presenting	marketing	and	advertisements	to	customers,	monitoring	for	security,	collecting	data	for	analysis,	one-party	actions	(such	as	one	user	sensing	a	second	user’s	signals	 without	 their	 knowledge	 or	 consent;	 or	 a	 customer	 service	 representative	sensing	a	customer),	or	two-party	interpersonal	actions	(such	as	two	users	sensing	and	sharing	 their	 signals	 with	 each	 other).	 While	 shopping	 malls	 are	 privately	 owned,	shopping	malls	 are	 still	 semi-public	 spaces,	 outside	 the	 sites	 of	 the	 private	 domestic	home	 or	 private	 workplace.1	 Prior	 research	 on	 human–computer	 interaction	 and	computer	mediated	 social	 interaction	 in	public	 space	 tends	 to	 take	 a	broader	 view	of	public	 spaces,	 including	 semi-public	 sites	 such	 as	 cafes,	 bars,	 train	 stations,	 and	restaurants,	 which	 serve	 the	 same	 social	 functions	 of	 public	 space	 of	 sociality	 and	recreation	 (Humphreys	 2005;	 Humphreys	 2010).	 From	 a	 user	 or	 consumer	 point	 of	view,	these	sites	constitute	being	“in	public.”	Thus	following	contextual	integrity’s	focus	on	the	perspective	of	users,	this	example	similarly	considers	a	broader	view	of	“public	space”	to	include	semi-public	sites	of	social	interaction,	such	as	shopping	malls.	
Actors	The	 data	 subjects	 in	 this	 context	 are	 the	 mall	 customers.	 Their	 data	 is	 sensed	 and	collected,	although	they	may	or	may	not	consent	to	the	collection	of	their	data	(or	may	consent	without	 full	 knowledge	 of	 the	 capabilities	 of	 technical	 sensors,	 inferences,	 or	full	knowledge	of	legal	protections	they	may	or	may	not	have).	The	data	collectors	vary,	but	 include	 the	 mall	 operators,	 mall	 security,	 store	 workers	 and,	 potentially,	 other	customers	 that	 have	 access	 to	 these	 sensors.	 Data	 recipients	 include	 all	 the	 data	
                                                
1 See, e.g., Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980). 
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collectors,	but	also	include	the	companies	that	process	and	return	the	data	collected	by	sensors,	and	potential	third	party	services	and	companies	that	store,	access,	or	further	process	the	data.	
Attributes	In	 a	 mall	 today,	 without	 remote	 biosensors,	 several	 attributes	 –	 or	 data	 types	 –	 are	already	in	play.	Photos	and	videos	of	customers	are	recorded	for	surveillance	purposes.	Customers’	 real-time	 locations	 can	 be	 collected	 and	 aggregated	 using	 cell	 phone	 data	(Clifford	and	Hardy	2013).	During	financial	transactions,	customers	may	share	personal	information	 such	 as	 their	 names,	 addresses,	 and	 credit	 card	 numbers.	 With	 remote	biosensed	information,	additional	attributes	are	invoked	as	well	–	both	those	collected	directly	 by	 the	 sensors	 and	 those	 that	may	be	 inferred	 from	 that	data.	 These	 sensors	may	 also	 collect	 photographic	 or	 video	 images,	 but	 at	 resolutions	 that	 allow	 pupil	measurement	and	the	 inference	of	one’s	 identity,	emotions,	arousal,	and	health	status.	Body	temperature	and	infrared	images	can	be	collected	as	well,	which	may	be	used	to	analyze	activity	 level	and	health	status.	Heartbeat	and	breathing	activity	data	can	also	be	collected,	providing	insight	into	activity	level,	health	status,	excitement,	and	stress.	
Principles	of	transmission	The	contextual	 integrity	heuristic	 asks	us	 to	 contemplate	 current	baseline	norms	 that	provide	 the	 principles	 of	 transmission	 and	 compare	 those	 to	 any	 changes	 in	 the	principles	 of	 transmission.	 The	 principles	 of	 transmission	 are	 affected	 by	 current	practices,	 laws,	 technological	 capabilities,	 and	 social	 norms.	 Drawing	 on	 Solove’s	taxonomy	 of	 privacy	 harms,	 the	 processes	 of	 “transmission”	 can	 encompass	multiple	stages	 of	 the	 data	 lifecycle,	 including	 data	 collection,	 processing,	 and	 dissemination	(Solove	2006).	The	analysis	of	transmission	principles	in	this	example	draws	upon	prior	research	studying	user	behaviors	with	technology	and	attitudes	toward	data	collection	and	 sharing	 in	 public	 (and	 semi-public)	 spaces,	 current	 practices,	 current	 technical	capabilities	of	widely	 implemented	systems,	and	 laws	and	regulations	that	signify	and	help	set	social	norms.	While	acknowledging	that	there	are	a	range	of	behaviors	around	how	 individuals	 perceive	 and	 perform	 their	 identities	 and	 emotions,	 this	 analysis	focuses	 on	 some	 of	 the	 present	 principles	 surrounding	 the	 stage	 of	 collection,	 then	around	 the	 stages	 of	 data	 processing	 and	 dissemination.	 It	 then	 explores	 how	 the	collection,	processing,	and	dissemination	of	biosensed	data	may	change	those	particular	principles.		Currently,	 surveillance	 of	 physical	 spaces	 is	 primarily	 visual	 and	 camera-based	 (Räty	2010).	Furthermore,	in	research	studying	users’	perceptions	of	data	collection	with	new	augmented	reality	devices	in	public,	users	make	comparisons	to	already	existing	visual	recording	 technologies,	 including	 cellphone	 cameras	 and	 CCTV	 cameras	 (Denning,	Dehlawi,	and	Kohno	2014).	This	suggests	that	practices	and	expectations	around	these	existing	 visual	 technologies	 can	 be	 used	 to	 understand	 baseline	 norms	 that	 provide	principles	of	transmission.	Currently,	security	cameras	can	only	capture	what	is	within	their	line	of	sight,	and	the	cameras’	locations	are	generally	visible	to	customers.	Due	to	the	cameras’	visibility	by	virtue	of	 their	physical	placement	as	well	as,	 frequently,	 the	presence	of	posted	notices,	customers	can	choose	to	avoid	an	area	or	avoid	a	camera’s	line	of	sight	should	they	not	want	to	be	recorded,	or	customers	may	elect	to	change	their	behavior	or	self-presentation	(Massimi	et	al.	2010).	Video	surveillance	is	also	conducted	at	a	resolution	that	might	allow	facial	recognition	–	either	computationally	or	by	other	
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humans,	 though	 with	 limited	 accuracy	 and	 consistency	 (Trottier	 2014;	 Introna	 and	Nissenbaum	2009)	–	but	not	at	a	resolution	that	would	allow	for	iris	detection	or	pupil	measurement.	 These	 technical	 limitations	 of	 video	 surveillance	 create	 structural	protections	for	privacy,	that	is,	privacy	is	implicitly	protected	because	certain	technical	capabilities	do	not	yet	exist	or	impose	heavy	costs	to	implement	(Surden	2007).	These	limitations	also	create	normative	expectations	about	what	is	possible	and	acceptable	to	monitor	and	collect.		In	 interpersonal	 interactions	 inside	 the	 mall,	 people	 expect	 that	 they	 can	 remain	pseudonymous	 and	 not	 reveal	 their	 identity	 while	 walking	 around;	 in	 other	 words,	people	 expect	 information	 about	 their	 identity	 to	not	 be	 collected.	 People	 expect	 that	they	can	interact	interpersonally	without	revealing	their	identity	as	well,	such	as	asking	an	employee	for	help	or	asking	another	person	for	directions.	Individuals	have	control	over	when	to	reveal	their	identity.	In	these	interactions,	people’s	“body	language”	might	be	interpreted,	but	it	cannot	be	measured	or	independently	verified.	One’s	ground	truth	emotions	and	mental	states	are	generally	considered	to	be	personal	and	generally	vague	in	 nature	 –	 even	 if	 sometimes	 outwardly	 expressed	 or	 revealed	 in	 fleeting	 reactions.	Prior	work	has	found	that	people	act	in	accordance	to	social	norms	that	allow	others	to	have	private	conversations	in	public	spaces.	For	instance,	Humphreys	(2005)	finds	that	often	in	public	spaces,	when	someone	is	conducting	a	conversation	on	a	mobile	phone,	he	 or	 she	 will	 turn	 away	 or	 shield	 their	 face	 while	 other	 people	 in	 their	 party	 will	occupy	themselves	with	other	activities	–	even	if	they	are	able	hear	the	conversation	–	in	order	to	acknowledge	the	social	norms	of	private	conversation	in	public.	Social	norms	also	limit	what	types	of	recording	activities	are	deemed	appropriate	in	public	spaces	–	for	 instance,	 nonconsensual,	 perverse	 video	 recordings	 of	 others	 in	 public	 spaces	 are	deemed	unacceptable	socially.	In	many	states	in	the	US,	voyeurism	laws	support	these	social	norms	concerning	inappropriate	uses	of	cameras	(Solove	and	Schwartz	2015).		Transmission	principles	regarding	the	processing	and	dissemination	of	data	collected	in	a	public	space	such	as	a	shopping	mall	 include	data	sharing	with	 third	parties	only	 in	particular	circumstances	and	maintaining	data	security	when	the	data	are	shared.	While	many	people	expect	to	be	recorded	by	CCTV	cameras	in	public	spaces	(Nguyen,	Kobsa,	and	Hayes	2008),	people’s	expectations	suggest	that	collected	data	should	not	be	widely	shared	 for	 processing	 and	 dissemination.	 Users	 tend	 to	 expect	 that	 the	 people	 with	access	 to	 recordings	 of	 public	 spaces	 include	 security	 personnel,	 employees,	 owners,	and	the	police,	but	do	not	expect	the	material	to	be	distributed	to	other	actors	(Massimi	et	al.	 2010).	 Other	 studies	 corroborate	 this,	 finding	 that	 participants	 view	 camera	installations	 in	 public	 spaces	 to	 be	 less	 acceptable	 if	 footage	 is	 streamed	 to	 a	 remote	location	(Friedman	et	al.	2006).	While	surveillance	camera	data	may	be	shared	with	law	enforcement	 (with	 a	warrant),	 traditional	CCTV	 surveillance	 camera	 footage	 is	 stored	locally.		Today,	 internet	 connected	 (IP-based)	 security	 cameras	 already	 challenge	 these	transmission	 principles,	 as	 the	 video	 data	 could	 easily	 be	 stored	 offsite	 with	 third	parties.	These	types	of	distributed	architectures	also	allow	for	new	types	of	processing,	such	as	automated	or	crowdsourced	facial	recognition	(Introna	and	Nissenbaum	2009;	Trottier	 2014).	 These	 emerging	 forms	 of	 data	 processing	 may	 create	 changes	 to	 the	transmission	principles,	 by	 allowing	new	actors	 access	 to	 the	data,	 violating	 subjects’	
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reasonable	 expectations,	 or	 changing	 how	 privacy	 risks	 and	 benefits	 are	 distributed	among	people	and	groups	(Introna	and	Nissenbaum	2009).		When	interacting	with	retailers,	customers	expect	their	personal	financial	information	–	such	 as	 credit	 card	 number,	 name,	 and	 address	 –	 to	 be	 processed	 by	 external	institutions,	but	this	is	done	in	the	context	of	a	transaction,	such	as	a	purchase.	Engaging	in	 this	 transaction	 provides	 implicit	 consent	 for	 the	 transmission	 and	 use	 of	 this	information	 for	 purposes	 of	 the	 transaction.	 Customers	may	 also	 expect	 the	 store	 to	collect	purchase	data	 to	understand	customers’	habits,	possibly	using	a	 third	party	 to	process	 the	 information.	 The	 results	 of	 this	 information	 processing	 may	 be	 used	 as	feedback	to	try	to	emotionally	manipulate	customers’	purchasing	habits	through	pricing	strategies,	“sales”	signs,	physically	arranging	displays	in	particular	ways,	or	using	music	or	aromas	in	the	store	(Klosowski	2013).	However,	this	data	processing	(and	resulting	feedback	 interventions)	 are	 done	 at	 aggregate	 levels,	 either	 on	 all	 customers	 or	 on	broad	demographics	such	as	age	or	gender.	Data	subjects	also	generally	expect	that	data	security	 precautions	 are	 taken	 during	 the	 processing	 of	 their	 data.	 Principles	 of	 data	security	 are	 also	 established	 through	 technical	 frameworks	 and	 standards	 that	companies	 follow,	 such	 as	 the	 ISO	 27001	 standard	 (ISO	 2017)	 or	NIST	 Cybersecurity	Framework	(NIST	2014).		The	 introduction	of	 remote	biosensing	 technologies	 into	 the	mall	 setting	may	disrupt	these	 principles	 and	 norms.	 Biosignals	 are	 intimate	 yet	 leakable,	 allowing	 remote	biosensors	 to	 collect	 the	 data	without	 sustained	 contact	 and	without	 a	 line	 of	 vision,	such	as	Vital	Radio,	which	wirelessly	detects	heartbeats.	Sensors	that	are	not	cameras	may	 not	 look	 like	 sensors	 either.	 Without	 these	 visual	 cues,	 customers	 may	 not	 be	aware	 that	 the	 sensors	 even	 exist	 or	 that	 their	 signals	 are	being	 collected,	 processed,	and	disseminated	–	by	 the	mall,	by	stores	and	their	employees,	or	by	other	 individual	customers.	The	uses	of	biosensors	described	above	may	allow	stores	to	build	biosensed	profiles	 over	 time	 about	 individual	 customers	 and	 target	 advertisements	 or	 products	directly	to	individuals.		The	limited	controllability	of	biosignals	suggests	that	information	that	was	once	latently	protected	 and	 hidden,	 such	 as	 identity,	 emotions,	 body	 temperature,	 activity	 level,	 or	stress,	 are	 now	 open	 to	 being	 collected	 by	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 actors	 including	 mall	management,	store	employees,	and	other	customers.	This	information	can	be	collected	when	one	is	simply	in	the	presence	of	the	biosensors,	outside	of	the	contexts	of	financial	transactions	or	 interpersonal	 interactions.	Thus,	 it	becomes	easy	to	capture	biosignals	without	customers’	knowledge	or	consent,	whether	explicit	or	implicit.	This	means	that	customers	may	lose	their	ability	to	walk	around	a	mall	anonymously	and	they	may	lose	plausible	deniability	about	their	emotional	states.		The	actors	who	receive	the	 information	for	processing	and	dissemination	are	 likely	to	expand.	Because	biosensed	information	is	precise	yet	ambiguous,	the	data	will	likely	be	processed	by	and	disseminated	to	third	parties,	such	as	data	analytics	companies	or	by	the	 companies	 that	 create	 the	 technologies.	 These	 data	 are	 then	 interpreted	 and	returned	back	to	the	end	user.	In	many	cases,	the	end	users	will	not	be	the	data	subjects.	For	 instance,	a	store	may	use	a	set	of	biosensors	 to	collect	data	on	 its	customers,	and	then	use	third-parties	to	analyze	those	data.	This	creates	a	new	long-term	and	ongoing	relationship	between	end	users	 and	 the	data	 recipients	who	process	 and	disseminate	
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the	data.	This	stands	in	contrast	to	the	traditional	model	where	the	company	who	sold	a	surveillance	camera	to	a	mall	did	not	get	full	access	to	the	recordings	of	every	camera	it	sold.	 Furthermore,	 mall	 customers	 are	 unlikely	 to	 know	 of	 these	 data	 processing	recipients	 or	 that	 their	 data	 is	 being	 sent	 to	 and	 analyzed	 by	 these	 recipients.	 The	technical	capabilities	or	new	biosensors	make	it	likely	that	this	type	of	data	processing,	dissemination,	and	feedback	can	occur	continuously	rather	than	being	tied	to	particular	transactions,	 and	 can	 occur	 at	 an	 individual	 level	 rather	 than	 an	 aggregate	 one.	Together,	these	shifts	in	the	transmission	principles	suggest	new	types	of	privacy	harms	that	may	occur	with	the	deployment	of	biosensing	technologies	in	public	spaces.	
Biosensing:	beyond	information	privacy	As	 highlighted	 above,	 in	 the	 examples	 of	 early	 photography	 and	 Google	 Glass,	 public	fears	 about	 the	 ability	 to	 capture	 unsavory	 emotions	 or	 surreptitiously	 record	individuals	 is	 particularly	 poignant	 in	 the	 case	 of	 biosensing	 technology.	 By	 using	contextual	 integrity	 as	 a	 heuristic,	 the	 previous	 section	 further	 explored	 how	 remote	biosensing	in	a	public	context	may	challenge	and	frustrate	social	and	legal	norms.	Based	upon	the	public	context	 for	biosensing,	 this	paper	now	considers	how	biosensing	may	require	a	new	risk	model	for	privacy	extending	beyond	information	privacy	alone.	Drawing	 upon	 Tavani’s	 (2008)	 categorization	 of	 four	 distinct	 types	 of	 privacy	 –	 (1)	physical/accessibility,	(2)	decisional,	(3)	psychological/mental,	and	(4)	informational	–	this	section	briefly	examines	the	potential	for	biosensing	in	public	to	infringe	on	more	than	 one	meaning	 of	 privacy.	 Physical	 privacy,	which	 focuses	 primarily	 on	privacy	 as	physical	non-intrusion,	may	be	considered	the	least	relevant	to	public	biosensing.	Even	in	 the	 cases	where	 casual	 and	unforced	 contact	might	be	needed	 to	mediate	 a	 sensor	reading,	there	would	be	no	mandatory	or	disruptive	physical	impact	to	the	person.		Decisional	privacy	may	be	considered	the	 freedom	from	interference	affecting	choices	like	 education,	 health	 care,	 career,	 personal	 life,	 and	beliefs	 (Floridi	 2006).	Biosensed	information	easily	gives	outsiders	clues	 to	 individuals’	 reactions,	attitudes	 towards	an	object	or	situation,	or	belies	one’s	ambivalence	about	a	situation.	Gathering	biosensed	data	 creates	 an	 opportunity	 to	 interfere	 with	 or	 manipulate	 results.	 For	 instance,	 in	Mexico,	 political	 campaigns	 have	 used	 biosignals	 like	 heart	 rate,	 facial	 coding,	 and	neuro-feedback	(collected	from	EEG	data	in	the	lab	since,	as	of	2018,	EEG	data	cannot	be	remotely	 or	 casually	 sensed)	 to	 assess	 voter	 attitudes	 and	 reactions	 to	 particular	campaign	material	 (Randall	2015).	Collecting	 these	data	remotely	 in	 the	wild	 to	 tailor	advertising,	including	campaign	material,	is	not	far	off.	Smart-shelf	technology	has	also	been	developed	by	companies	 like	 snack	maker	Mondelez	 International	 Inc.	 to	 collect	real-time	 demographic	 and	 behavioral	 data	 about	 customers	 in	 order	 to	 present	 a	customized	 ad	 experience	 that	 makes	 impulsive	 junk-food	 purchases	 even	 more	tempting	 (Boulton	 2013;	 Truth	 Labs,	 2014).	 These	 decisional	 interventions	 could	 be	made	 to	manipulate	 and	 interfere	with	 countless	 areas	of	 life,	 or	be	designed	 to	prey	upon	our	behavioral	vulnerabilities	like	addictions.		The	 psychological	 or	 mental	 privacy	 to	 protect	 our	 intimate	 thoughts	 remains	 fairly	straightforward	 for	 biosensed	 data.	 Scientists	 and	 evolutionary	 psychologists	 have	studied	why	 some	 cues	 are	made	 public	 to	 assist	 us	 in	 public	 settings.	 For	 instance,	tears	are	thought	to	be	a	subtle	cue	to	instigate	empathy	from	others	within	a	few	feet,	but	 when	 biosensed	 data	 like	 emotions	 or	 internal	 physiological	 states	 are	
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systematically	 recorded	 and	 analyzed,	 all	 signals	 become	 magnified	 beyond	 their	original	natural	public	scope.	Further,	inferences	drawn	from	data	individuals	may	not	necessarily	know	or	feel	within	themselves	not	only	violates	their	inner	most	thoughts	but,	importantly,	may	circumvent	our	internal	mental	states	altogether	by	presenting	an	algorithmic	 determination	 back	 to	 us,	 thus	 preventing	 our	 own	 emotional	 processes.	The	ways	in	which	biosensing	data	in	public	could	both	intrude	and	interfere	with	our	mental	states	and	cause	harm	are	numerous	and	present	new	challenges.		The	 informational	 meaning	 of	 privacy	 remains	 the	 most	 similar	 to	 other	 modern	challenges	toward	limiting	access	and	allowing	control	over	one’s	personal	information.	Biosensing	creates	 the	potential	 for	a	greater	amount	of	an	entirely	new	data	class	of	intimate	 information	to	be	gleaned	at	a	high	rate	 from	public	encounters	and	kept	 for	indiscriminate	amounts	of	 time.	The	ways	 in	which	 information	privacy	may	result	 in	inappropriate	flows	of	information	and	potential	harms	are	numerous	and	vast.		Though	Warren	 and	 Brandeis	 (1890)	 bring	 up	 emotions	 specifically	 in	 the	 call	 for	 a	right	 to	 privacy,	 current	 legal	 and	 policy	 frameworks	may	 not	 be	 able	 to	 fully	 cover	privacy	harms	beyond	information	privacy.	The	ability	to	ascertain	and	make	judgments	(undoubtedly	 subjective	 and	 with	 bias)	 about	 internal	 emotional	 states	 using	biosensing	technology	and	using	these	inferences	to	interfere	with	decisional	autonomy	creates	additional	legal	tensions	relating	to	privacy.	
Sensing	and	legal	frameworks	The	fuzziness	around	what	type	of	data	biosensing	information	may	be	categorized	as,	emerging	inferential	power,	along	with	the	rapidly	expanding	potential	for	new	remote	technologies	 (that	 may	 be	 both	 inexpensive,	 discrete,	 and	 able	 to	 capture	 new	unfamiliar	data	types)	frustrate	current	legal	frameworks.	This	paper	focuses	on	EU	and	US	 laws	 due	 to	 their	 respective	 prominence	 in	 global	 privacy	 law	 and	 contrasting	approaches.		The	forthcoming	EU	General	Data	Protection	Regulation	(GDPR),2	which	will	supersede	the	 Data	 Protection	 Directive3	 in	 May	 2018,	 will	 likely	 prevent	 almost	 all	 public	collection	and	processing	of	 individuals’	biosignals	without	explicit	permission	by	 the	individual.	 “Personal	 data”	 is	 defined	 as	 “any	 information	 relating	 to	 an	 identified	 or	identifiable	natural	person”	where	an	identifiable	person	is	one	who	can	be	directly	or	indirectly	identified	by	referencing	identifiers	like	name,	ID	number,	 location,	or	using	one	 or	more	 factors	 specific	 to	 that	 person	 –	 including	 physiological,	 genetic,	mental,	and	 social	 identity.4	 The	 regulation	 specifically	 calls	 out	 “biometric	 data”	 as	 a	 special	category	of	personal	data	subject	to	heightened	scrutiny.5	Biometric	data	is	defined	by	the	regulation	as	“personal	data	resulting	from	the	specific	technical	processing	relating	to	physical,	physiological,	or	behavioral	characteristics	of	a	natural	person,	which	allow	or	 confirm	 the	 unique	 identification	 of	 that	 natural	 person,	 such	 as	 facial	 images	 or	dactyloscopic	data.”6	
                                                
2 Regulation (EU) 2016/679, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1. 
3 Directive 95/46/EC, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EU). 
4 Regulation (EU) 2016/679, art. 4, para. 1, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1, 33. 
5 Regulation (EU) 2016/679, art. 9, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1, 38. 
6 Regulation (EU) 2016/679, art. 4, para. 14, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1, 33. 
 	 15	
	These	 definitions	 could	 be	 problematic	 because	 not	 all	 biosensing	 data	 may	 be	identifiable	 or	 able	 to	 authenticate	 an	 individual	 but	 could	 still	 be	 revealing	 –	 a	heightened	heartrate	signal	can	still	be	used	to	help	make	real-time	assessments	about	a	response	 or	 state	 even	 if	 it	 is	 not	 uniquely	 identifiable	 or	 combined	 with	 personal	information.	Though	the	ability	to	isolate	biosignals	from	other	indirect	identifiers	like	location	data	is	unlikely.			Further,	 it	 is	 possible	 for	 biosensing	 to	 frustrate	 EU	 restrictions	 on	 the	 collection	 of	biosignals	information	by	satisfying	any	number	of	exceptions	listed	under	Article	9	of	the	GDPR.	The	law	allows	an	exception	if	“processing	relates	to	personal	data	which	are	manifestly	made	public	by	the	data	subject.”7	As	discussed	in	this	paper,	many	of	these	signals	are	of	limited	control	and	outward	facing,	and	thus	may	be	considered	“public”	within	 the	 context	 of	 this	 law.	 Explicit	 consent	 from	 the	 data	 subject	 allows	 for	 the	processing	 of	 personal	 data,	 and	 thus	 biosignals	 that	 are	 tied	 to	 identity.	 Given	 the	familiar	yet	ambiguous	and	inferential	potential	of	 these	signals,	 it	 is	not	unlikely	that	someone	may	consent	to	having	their	heart	rate	recorded	without	understanding	how	it	may	 be	 used	 to	make	 inferences	 about	 their	 health	 or	 emotional	 states.	 Consent	 also	may	be	given	without	complete	understanding	of	the	ambiguous	nature	of	these	signals	and	 the	 potential	 for	 improper	 categorization,	 like	 elevated	 heartrate	 inferring	 poor	health	state	instead	of	genetic	variability.	Even	with	the	ability	to	easily	revoke	consent,	subjects	 may	 not	 fully	 understand	 the	 implications	 or	 inherent	 ambiguity	 of	 these	signals	 in	 a	way	 that	motivates	 action	 to	 do	 so.	 The	 personal	 and	 “household	 use”	 of	these	data	would	also	be	permitted,	which	further	underscores	the	importance	of	social	norms	in	negotiating	privacy	in	these	unregulated	social	contexts.			Biosignals	 could	also	 challenge	broader	 clauses	within	 the	 law,	 like	processing	 that	 is	“necessary	 for	 the	purposes	of	preventative	or	occupational	medicine,”	or	 for	medical	assessment.	 Many	 biosignals	 could	 lead	 to	 important	 biomedical	 inferences	 about	individuals,	and	government,	public	health	officials,	or	private	healthcare	providers	may	be	able	to	use	these	 justifications	as	means	to	wider	collection	and	use.	There	may	be	additional	exemptions	such	as	those	related	to	national	security	that	open	up	other	uses	of	biosignals.	Even	with	the	most	comprehensive	privacy	laws	to	date,	public	biosignal	collection	 may	 still	 pose	 privacy	 harms	 within	 the	 EU	 and	 spur	 further	 debates	regarding	the	definition	and	classification	of	biosignals	as	a	new	class	of	sensitive	data.	The	numerous	ways	in	which	GDPR	may	fully	cover	or	leave	opportunities	for	biosignal	use	 is	beyond	 the	 scope	of	 this	paper,	but	will	be	 important	 in	 future	 research	as	 the	policy	and	biosensing	technologies	mature.		Unlike	the	EU,	the	US	has	no	single	data	protection	law	but	has	legislated	on	an	ad	hoc	basis	 for	 particular	 sectors	 or	 circumstances.	 Privacy	 coverage	 under	 the	 Health	Insurance	 Portability	 and	 Accountability	 Act	 (HIPAA)8	 would	 only	 be	 potentially	extended	 to	 biosignals	 collected	 by	 organizations	 subject	 to	 the	 “privacy	 rule”	 –	 i.e.,	those	 defined	 as	 covered	 entities.9	 In	 situations	 where	 a	 patient	 presents	 their	 own	
                                                
7 Regulation (EU) 2016/679, art. 9, para. 2(e), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1, 38. 
8 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–191, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
(110 Stat.) 1936 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d-1 to d-9 (2012)). 
9 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, et seq., 164.104 (2014). 
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collected	biosignals	to	a	healthcare	professional,	it	is	unclear	at	what	point,	if	any,	those	data	may	be	considered	covered	information.	In	general	in	the	US,	biosignals	associated	with	 wearable	 “wellness”	 devices	 are	 considered	 low	 risk	 and	 the	 Food	 and	 Drug	Administration	 (FDA)	 does	 not	 regulate	 the	 production	 and	 use	 of	 these	 devices.	 It	could	be	possible	that	a	law	similar	to	HIPAA	could	regulate	the	exchange	and	storage	of	biosensing	 data	 when	 held	 by	 particular	 entities,	 but	 the	 coverage	 of	 potential	 data	collectors	and	holders	would	be	limited.		In	the	US,	it	could	be	possible	for	a	privacy	law	like	the	Video	Voyeurism	Prevention	Act	of	200410	to	prohibit	the	particular	use	of	a	type	of	technology.	In	response	to	the	rise	of	cell	 phone	 cameras	 that	 were	 discrete	 enough	 to	 allow	 surreptitious	 image	 capture,	notably	 around	 loose	 garments	 of	 unconsenting	 individuals,	 states	 and	 the	 federal	government	responded	with	video	voyeurism	laws	to	make	this	particular	use	of	 legal	cameras	 illegal.	A	 legal	 restriction	on	particular	 information	gathering	activities	using	otherwise	 legal	 instruments	 could	 theoretically	be	possible	 to	prevent	particular	data	collection	from	remote	biosensing	technologies.		Finally,	 within	 the	 US,	 the	 Federal	 Trade	 Commission	 (FTC)	 would	 likely	 be	 the	strongest	enforcer	of	privacy	infringements	through	its	mandate	to	prevent	unfair	and	deceptive	commercial	practices	(FTC	1980;	FTC	1983).	Cases	brought	by	the	FTC	would	be	responsive	to	the	undisclosed	use,	misuse,	or	insecure	storage	of	biosensed	data	by	commercial	 actors	 in	 the	 US.	 While	 cases	 may	 be	 reactive	 to	 harms	 caused	 to	consumers,	 it	 may	 be	 possible	 for	 the	 FTC	 to	 issue	 guidance	 on	 responsible	 uses	 of	biosensing	technology	and	data	similar	to	how	the	agency	has	done	recently	in	regards	to	the	internet	of	things	(FTC	2015).	
Conclusion:	a	consideration	of	remedies	In	 some	 ways,	 the	 ability	 to	 remotely	 collect	 emotional	 profiles	 or	 record	 others	 in	public	 is	similar	to	traditional	photography	and	the	tensions	highlighted	in	the	Google	Glass	debate.	However,	the	unique	nature	of	biosensed	data	as	an	emerging	data	class	with	 particular	 attributes	 regarding	 meaning,	 integrity,	 and	 availability	 complicate	existing	 social	 norms	 and	 privacy	 laws.	 As	 further	 demonstrated	 using	 contextual	integrity,	the	ability	to	record	remotely	in	public	ushers	in	new	tensions	and	highlights	gaps	in	current	legal	structures	that	may	not	fully	consider	the	ability	to	infringe	upon	decisional	and	emotional	privacy	in	addition	to	expected	information	privacy	concerns.	The	possible	 remedies	 related	 to	biosensing	 in	public	 require	additional	 research	and	debate.	As	discussed	in	this	paper,	existing	privacy	laws	and	regulations	in	the	EU	and	US	contain	gaps	that	could	allow	for	harm	by	biosensing	technologies	and	the	collection,	use,	and	sharing	of	associated	data.	However,	broad	restrictions	on	the	use	of	personal	information,	 like	 those	 in	 the	 EU,	 could	 help	 stem	 some	 harms	 linked	 to	 making	inferences	about	an	individual’s	mental	or	physical	states,	and	additional	regulation	on	the	 use	 of	 these	 technologies	 in	 non-identifying	 situations	 may	 be	 necessary.	 Better	privacy	 protection	 could	 be	 afforded	 by	 restricting	 particular	 collection	 activities	 or	biosensing	 technology	 uses,	 similar	 to	 the	 laws	 regulating	 video	 voyeurism	 with	cameras.	These	 laws	could	potentially	act	as	a	deterrent	or	create	 the	opportunity	 for	remedies	 of	 harms	 done.	 Additionally,	 protecting	 the	 storage	 and	 exchange	 of	
                                                
10 18 U.S.C. § 1801 (2004). 
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biosensing	data	in	a	HIPAA	style	law	could	prevent	some	harms	by	providing	standards	and	 protections	 for	 these	 data,	 but	 may	 be	 limited	 in	 the	 range	 of	 entities	 covered.	Retroactive	regulation	for	harms	conducted	by	private	industry	or	perhaps	individuals	will	certainly	be	important	as	biosensing	becomes	more	pervasive,	but	will	necessarily	be	reactive	instead	of	preventative.		Other	potential	 remedies	beyond	 law	and	policy	may	be	 important	 to	 adapting	 social	norms.	 Personal	modulation	 as	 a	 form	of	 individual	 obfuscation	may	 be	 possible	 and	serve	 as	 a	 remedy	 against	 remote	 intrusion.	 Instrument	 jammers,	 data	 spoofers,	 or	physical	blocks	may	be	worn	to	prevent	some	types	of	biosensing	measurements.	Masks	may	be	used	 to	prevent	emotional	analysis,	 and	photography	may	be	muddled	by	 the	use	of	 reflective	 scarves	 that	block	 images	 taken	with	 flash	 (Access	All	Brands	2017).	Though	 these	 are	 not	 geared	 specifically	 for	 biosensing,	 they	 represent	 opportunities	individuals	may	be	able	to	take	in	the	absence	of	legal	or	social	control.	These	remedies,	and	 the	roles	 they	may	have	 in	developing	social	norms,	should	be	explored	 in	 future	work.		Community	standards	may	be	an	option	to	complement	social	norms	as	a	soft	 form	of	technology	regulation.	Social	community	standards	may	make	particular	actions	using	biosensing	technology	inappropriate	and	socially	unacceptable	due	to	peer	pressure	or	public	 ridicule	 –	 or	 vice	 versa	 making	 evolving	 biosensing	 applications	 acceptable.	Additionally,	 there	 may	 be	 an	 opportunity	 to	 develop	 technical	 standards	 into	biosensing	technology	that	allow	a	value	to	become	embedded	into	the	design	–	similar	to	efforts	 to	make	Do	Not	Track	a	standard	 for	webpages	online.	This	would	 likely	be	considered	more	of	a	technical	standard	setting	effort	as	opposed	to	social	community	standard,	but	could	offer	a	similar	remedy.		Anticipating	new	privacy	concerns	in	public	spaces	due	to	the	rise	in	remote	biosensing	technologies,	 our	 use	 of	 the	 contextual	 integrity	 heuristic	 identifies	 several	 potential	privacy	concerns,	and	discussed	potential	remedies.	This	is	just	a	first	step	in	a	broader	conversation	 about	 privacy,	 ethics,	 and	 values	 –	 in	 the	 future,	 various	 ethical	considerations	 may	 determine	 that	 other	 interests	 and	 values	 outweigh	 the	 privacy	concerns	 of	 these	 technologies.	 Yet	 these	 conversations	 must	 occur	 actively	 (and	proactively),	 among	 technologists,	 policymakers,	 and	 the	 general	 public	 so	 that	technical,	legal,	and	social	decisions	are	made	explicitly.	
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